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Abstract:
This analysis, in terms of a four-sector static general equilibrium framework, models the
urban informal sector for a typical developing economy with labour market distortion in the
form of unionised urban sector labour market and capital market segmentation between urban
informal and formal credit markets. It has been highlighted in different literature that growth
experience in the South Asian countries like India or Pakistan during liberalised regime have
primarily been driven by the productivity take-off in the traded sectors. This theoretical
analysis offers another attempt to predict the implications of technological progress in the
traded formal sectors on informal wage, taking into consideration that real wage is a
reasonable benchmark to measure the well-being of the economically marginalised people
living under informal arrangements. The key model propositions are further exemplified by a
sensitivity analysis using plausible ranges of parameter values for India. We also provide
empirical evidence using data on twenty-seven Indian States (including one Union Territory)
between 1989 and 2010 on informal wages, capital stocks in informal and formal zones and
value-additions in the formal segment to substantiate the model prediction on informal wage
depicted in our numerical exercise, which shows that the growth in informal wage could
reasonably be linked to the productivity surge in the formal sectors, while greater capital
accumulation in the informal units over the formal counterparts has further aggravated this
upswing in informal wages.
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21. Introduction:
It is well-known that in a developing economy the ‘informal sector’ hosts a substantial part of
the workforce in unregistered activities, primarily characterised by ease of entry and
unregulated markets. As suggested by many authors (Agenor (1996), Schneider and Enste
(2000) and the references therein) more than 70% of the workforce is engaged in the informal
sectors of a less developed country (LDC). In South Asian countries like India and Pakistan a
significant proportion (about 85% in non-agricultural activities in India for example) of the
working population are engaged in the informal sectors1.
Here we define ‘informal’ sector as the unregulated sector where minimum wage laws are not
maintained, pertaining to non-traded items in the economy, comprising of own-account
enterprises as well as many subcontract firms producing various parts and semi-processed
components for the parent formal sector firms. This definition allows us to focus on the
economic conditions of the majority of the workforce in LDCs like India and Pakistan.
As shown in different papers (Chaudhuri 2001; Koizumi and Kopecky 1977, 1980; Findlay
1980) liberalising a developing economy may result in technological progress as a peer-effect
(such as an inflow of foreign capital usually leads to transfer of technology from the foreign
producers to the destination sector of the recipient country). Such productivity improvement
can lead to rise in per capita income of the host country (Chaudhuri 2005; Mukherjee (in
press)). In fact, the most important determinant of the boom in Indian growth during
liberalised regime has primarily been the productivity improvement in the organised sectors
(Kathuria et al. 2013, Guha-Khasnobis and Bari 2003; Marjit, 2005). Such a technological
change should have some impact on informal activities, wages and employment. The way
production is organised between the formal and informal segments should also be affected.
A large part of such employment opportunities is generated in the urban or semi-urban areas
where majority of the workforce is economically marginalized. The social consequence of
such overall rise in growth rate must be reflected on the quality of life of these poor people.
While it is difficult to assess such an impact at the micro level and in terms of various
indicators of poverty and human development, we feel that informal wage and employment
are good indicators to link productivity improvement in the traded formal sectors and urban
poverty, given that most of the urban workforce in a typical developing economy (such as
India or Pakistan) are absorbed in this segment. Poor unskilled workers are not suffering from
unemployment; but their problem is the abysmal wages offered to them which they often find
insufficient to meet their minimum daily needs. Therefore as argued in Kar and Marjit
(2009), Marjit and Kar (2009) and others we also think informal wage is the reasonable
benchmark to measure the conditions of living of these poor people.
2. The Existing Literature and Major Research Gap:
1 For Pakistan, Small Manufacturing Enterprises (SMEs) are included in the ‘informal sector’.
3The key hypothesis we want to analyse is how informal wage responds following a
productivity take-off in the formal/organised sectors of the economy. Goldberg and Pavcnik
(2003) and Marjit, Ghosh and Biswas (2006) etc. have explored the asymmetric impact of
reform policies on the size of the informal sector. However LDCs like India and Pakistan are
also plagued by capital market segmentation among the organised formal and non-organised
informal sectors. It has been shown theoretically (Marjit 2003; Marjit and Kar 2004; Marjit,
Kar and Acharyya 2007; Marjit, Kar and Beladi 2007; Marjit and Kar 2008 a, b; Marjit Kar
and Maity 2008) that informal wage can change depending on various degrees of capital
mobility between formal and informal sectors. These studies use simple general equilibrium
structure to answer a critical question – how do exogenous policy changes in the formal
sector affect the wage and employment conditions in the informal sector? Marjit and Kar
(2009) assessed the implication of a tariff-cut in the organised formal sector on informal
wages, bringing the notion of different degrees of capital mobility between informal and
formal segments of the economy and how they affect the outcome on informal wage.
However while that paper attempted to check trade policy induced relative price effects on
real informal wage, the current paper highlights the productivity issue explicitly.
It should be mentioned that Marjit and Kar (2008) explored the link between labour
productivity growth and informal wage, emphasising the role of capital mobility between
formal and informal segments of the economy. However it has been illustrated in different
literature that informal sector firms are attached to the formal sector firms on a contractual
basis, where the formal sector firms are generally farming out a part or whole of their
production to the informal sector firms to avoid different regulations and associated costs
since the latter firms enjoy the advantage of cheaper labour supply, while the informal firms
are also dependent on formal firms for marketing their products and in particular for the
supply of credit from the formal sector firms since the formal firms, most often have an
advantage over the informal firms in the credit market. So it would be unrealistic to assume
like Marjit and Kar (2008, 2009) that the informal sector produces internationally traded final
good and capital is sector-specific, and thus the informal and formal credit markets are
completely disintegrated even in the short-run. This is because the informal sector money-
lender borrows capital from the formal credit market for re-lending. So a part of the formal
credit enters into the informal credit market. Therefore the ‘zero mobility’ case in Marjit and
Kar (2008, 2009) paper is unlikely to happen in reality.
There has been a pertinent debate on the desirability of various types of technological
progress among labour economists and trade-theorists (Jones 1996, 2003, 2006; Krugman
2000; Ethier 2005). Trade-theorists, emphasising the importance of relative factor intensities
in different sectors (Jones 1965; Oladi and Beladi 2007 and Beladi et al. 2008 etc.), argue
however, that a labour-augmenting type technological change in the labour-intensive sector
will push the wages up. This result is in contradiction to the usual predictions of labour
economists. Findlay and Jones (2000) argued that trade and labour theory outcomes will be
merged for a major modification of production structure consequent upon such a
technological progress. The most recent attempt has been made by Beladi et al. (2012) in
terms of a simple two-sector general equilibrium model with segmented labour markets to
4show that technological progress leads to opposite wage movement independent of relative
factor-intensity ranking between organised (formal) and non-organised (informal) labour
sectors. But the simple two-sector set-up in Beladi et al. (2012) was not quite generic to
portray the conditions of urban informal sector in a developing economy. It would be more
realistic to classify the urban informal sector as comprising of an industrial segment that uses
labour and capital to provide an intermediate input such as leather and rubber products,
electrical equipment etc. to the formal sector firm, being tied to the formal firm by the system
of subcontracting; another part can be treated as the informal service sector producing non-
traded services such as street-vendors with almost no use of capital. These possibilities have
been considered in Kar and Marjit (2009) and we have adopted this set-up as we believe their
production-structure is quite generic and plausible to map the urban informal sector for a poor
developing economy. However Kar and Marjit (2009) did not consider any dualism in
domestic capital market. The dominant feature of dualism in the capital market is the
fragmented interest rate structure, featuring lower allocation of loanable capital to the
informal sector at a higher relative rental rate. The informal producers do not have access to
credit from formal institutions and, therefore, have to depend on the informal credit market,
where rental cost of capital is exorbitantly high. We are going to incorporate this issue in our
model and hence this will become our point of departure from Kar and Marjit (2009).
3. The Model:
Consider a static general equilibrium model for a small, open developing economy with four
sectors: two urban formal sectors and two urban informal sectors. Among the two informal
sectors, one is an informal service sector (sector 1) providing non-traded services by the
unskilled (surplus) labour of the economy. Another sector (sector 2) is within the industrial
set-up, producing a non-traded intermediate input using unskilled labour and capital for the
formal export sector. Within the formal segment, the export sector (sector 3) uses skilled
labour2, capital and the intermediate input in the production process. Skilled wages are
pegged at a higher level by prior negotiations with labour unions through collective
bargaining3. Sector 4 is the tariff-protected import-competing sector of the economy using
skilled-labour and capital in its production process. Now countries like India and Pakistan
export primary agricultural products and also of high-skill products like computer software
(particularly India); while they are the net importers of relatively more capital-intensive but
less skill-intensive manufacturing products. Therefore we assume that sector 4 is the most
capital-intensive sector in the economy. In the Heckscher-Ohlin-Subsystem (HOSS) formed
2 Here by ‘skilled’ we do not mean only human capital. In fact the labourers in the formal sectors are
distinguished from the informal sector workers in terms of productivity. So by ‘skilled labour’ we mean the
combination of wage-earners, mangers, supervisors and clerical job-performers in the organised sector. And by
‘skilled wage’ we mean total wages and salaries paid to them, which includes the payments to the managers and
supervisors.
3For a similar treatment of unionised wage in the organised sector one can see Chaudhuri (2003, 2005),
Mukherjee (2012, 2014) etc. Assuming each firm of the organised sector has a separate labour union, the
unionised wage function may be derived as a solution to the Nash-bargaining game between the representative
firm and the representative union in the industry (Chaudhuri 2005, 2003; Norback 2001; Mukhopadhyay 2008;
etc.).
5by the two formal sectors, sector 4 is relatively capital-intensive compared to sector 3 in
physical and value terms.
The following notation is used:
W= competitive informal wage rate for unskilled labour (ܮത);
ܹௌ
∗= Unionised skilled wage rate in formal segment of the economy;
ܴ =rate of interest in the informal credit market;
ݎ=rate of interest in the formal credit market;
௝ܽ௜= amount of the ݆
th factor used to produce 1 unit of the ݅th good (݆= ܮ, ,ܵܭ;݅= 1,2,3,4);
ଶܽଷ = per-unit requirement of the non-traded intermediate input in the export sector;
ܭഥ = total stock of capital in the economy;
ܵ̅= stock of skilled labour in the economy;
ܭଵ = available capital in informal sector;
௜ܲ= domestic prices of non-traded goods (݅= 1,2);
௜ܲ
∗ = internationally given prices of traded goods (݅= 3,4);
ݐ= ad-valorem rate of tariff imposed on good 4.
ߠ௝௜= cost-share of factor ݆in the production of good ;݅
ߣ௝௜= share of sector i݅n the total employment of factor ;݆
∧ = proportional change.
Price-unit cost equality in competitive product markets entail:
ܹ ௅ܽଵ = ଵܲ (1)
ܹ ௅ܽଶ + ܴ ௄ܽଶ = ଶܲ (2)
ܹௌ
∗
ௌܽଷ + ܽݎ ௄ଷ + ଶܲ ଶܽଷ = ଷܲ∗ (3)
ܹௌ
∗
ௌܽସ + ܽݎ ௄ସ = ସܲ∗(1 + ݐ) (4)
We assume the following functional relationship between ܴandݎ:
ܴ = ߩݎ;ߩ> 1 (5)
6Here ߩ denotes the degree of imperfection of the informal credit market; ߩ> 1 implies that
ܴ > ݎ. This is because the informal moneylenders generally borrow funds from the formal
sector at the market rate of return ݎ, re-lend it to the informal borrowers and by this way
maximises net interest income4. Therefore it is realistic to assume that informal interest rate is
positively related to and steeply higher than the formal interest rate. The lower the number of
alternative sources of credit to the borrowers in the informal sector, the higher is the degree
of imperfection in the informal credit market and thereby the power of the informal sector
lenders to mark up interest rate in the informal credit market over the one in formal capital
market (i.e., greater value of ߩ).
Using (5), Equation (2) can be written as
ܹ ௅ܽଶ + ߩܽݎ ௄ଶ = ଶܲ (2.1)
Equations (1), (2.1), (3), (4) are the price-unit cost equality conditions for the informal
service sector, intermediate input producing sector, the export (formal) sector and the import-
competing manufacturing sector, which is relatively capital intensive compared to the
vertically integrated export sector.
We also assume that amount of credit allocated to the informal sector is a positive function of
the return differential between the two capital markets. Therefore as long as ߩ> 1, informal
capital market exists and thus the dichotomy between the two credit markets exists.
ܭଵ = ܭଵ(ܴ− ݎ) = ܭଵ{ݎ(ߩ− 1)}. So when (ܴ− ݎ) ≥ 0,ܭଵᇱ(. ) ≥ 0. (6)
So full utilisation of informal credit implies:
௄ܽଶܺଶ = ܭଵ{ݎ(ߩ− 1)} (7)
The two urban formal sectors use the formal credit. The equilibrium in the formal credit
market ensures that5
௄ܽଷܺଷ + ௄ܽସܺସ = ܭഥ− ܭଵ{ݎ(ߩ− 1)} (8)
The full employment of unskilled labour implies:
௅ܽଵ ଵܺ + ௅ܽଶܺଶ = ܮത (9)
The full employment condition for skilled labour implies
ௌܽଷܺଷ + ௌܽସܺସ = ܵ̅ (10)
The demand-supply equality condition for the non-traded input gives:
ଶܽଷܺଷ = ܺଶ (11)
4 So ݎcould also be interpreted as the opportunity cost of lending credit to the moneylender.
5 Assuming away the presence of foreign capital in the economy’s capital endowment.
7Also we assume that per-unit requirement of the intermediate input in sector 3 is constant. It
rules out the possibility of substitution between the non-traded intermediary and other factors
of production in sector 3. This is not totally unrealistic assumption. For example, one pair of
shoes produced in the informal sector does not change in quantity when it is marketed by the
formal sector as a final commodity. Thus there remains a fixed proportion between the use of
the intermediate input and the quantity of the final commodity produced and marketed by the
formal sector. Gupta (1994), Chaudhuri (2005), Chaudhuri et al. (2006) have used this
assumption.
The four price variables can be solved in the following way: ݎ is determined from Equation
(4) given the unionised skilled wage and exogenous price of the importable. Given ݎ, one can
determine ଶܲ from Equation (3) and given the policy-parameter ߩ, substituting ݎ and ଶܲ in
Equation (2.1) one can obtain ܹ . Finally from Equation (1) ଵܲ is found substituting ܹ . Once
factor prices are known, factor-coefficients ௝ܽ௜s are also known. Now using the value of
ݎand givenߩ, we can find ܭଵ(. ) from Equation (6). Then simultaneously solving Equations
(8) and (10) we get ܺଷ and ܺସ. Then ܺଶ is solved from Equation (11)
6. Substituting ܺଶ in
Equation (9), ଵܺ will be solved.
4. Comparative Static Exercises7.
First let us assume the productivity parameters are such that only sector 4 (the import-
competing and relatively capital-intensive segment of the formal zone) experiences
technological progress by ߙ > 0. Then the implication on informal workers can be
summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 1:
In the absence of any reform in the informal credit market, a productivity take-off in the
relatively capital-intensive import-competing formal segment unambiguously reduces
commodity prices and wages in both informal sectors. The informal sector producing
intermediate input for the export sector is more likely to contract in terms of both output and
employment; whereas the non-traded service sector is more likely to expand. However if
government would intervene to undertake a reform policy which would reduce the mark-up
power of the informal money-lenders, that could help the workers in intermediate input
producing sector.
Intuitive Explanation: If the relatively capital-intensive import-competing formal segment
(sector 4) undergoes technological progress (uniform or factor-specific) by ߙ > 0, it will
raise only the rental to capital (given the fixed skilled wage); given that the production
6 Note that Equation (7) is not an independent equation.
7 The detailed algebraic results are provided at the appendix.
8functions in these two sectors are of variable-coefficient type, this will encourage a
Rybczynski-type effect in the Heckscher-Ohlin Subsystem (HOSS) formed by sector 3 and
sector 4 following which the relatively capital-intensive sector 4 expands but the export
sector (sector 3) contracts. So the demand for non-traded intermediate input falls given
supply. This will shrink the price of the intermediate input ( ଶܲ); whereas rental costs paid by
the informal producers rise. As a result from the zero-profit condition of sector 2 (the
intermediate input producing sector), it is clear that competitive unskilled wage rate should
fall. At the same time, since intermediate input is used in a fixed proportion in the export
sector production, which cannot be supplemented by other factors of production in sector 3,
this implies that sector 2 must shrink as well (complementary relationship between this two
sectors). Hence sector 2 will release unskilled labour which will be absorbed in sector 1, but
at a lower competitive wage than before. We call it the ‘first round’ effect.
However as ݎ rises (ܴ− ݎ) = ݎ(ߩ− 1) goes up as well. This will lower the supply of capital
to the formal capital market. This will induce a Rybczynski effect in the HOSS which would
tend to expand sector 3 and sector 2 (by complementarity assumption explained above) and
we call it as ‘second round’ effect. But this ‘second round’ effect is entirely the by-product of
the ‘first round’ effect. Therefore the ‘first round’ effect would likely to dominate and both
sector 3 and sector 2 would likely contract as a consequence.
In fact, it can readily be seen from our framework that if government would intervene aiming
to reduce the degree of imperfection in informal credit market and hence the informal rental
return (by reducing ߩ) in this scenario, that would tend to reduce the capital-cost of
intermediate input producers and thus would help the workers in sector 2. But in the absence
of any such reform, rental cost of intermediate input producers would always rise
unambiguously following technological improvement in sector 4. As a result some of the
industries in sector 2 would shut down and the rest will try to survive using less capital-
labour ratios in per-unit of production. This implies that only those unskilled workers who are
relatively more productive will remain in sector 2 and the rest will join sector 1. This is
welfare reducing from various points:
a) The downward pressure on wages of informal workers has clear impact on
aggravating poverty in the urban area. This is because a large share (above 78%) of
the urban poor in India and Pakistan works in the informal sector and any reduction in
the wages of the informal workers may increase significantly on the incidence of
poverty.
b) Sector 2 contracts in terms of both output and employment; so workers are forced to
leave the unregulated manufacturing firms and take up insecure non-traded service
sector jobs with lower earnings and hence greater likelihood of poverty.
When only the export sector undergoes technological progress by ߙ > 0, following
proposition is imminent from our model.
Proposition 2:
9If only the export sector would undergo productivity improvement by ߙ > 0, ceteris paribus,
product prices and competitive real wages of the informal workers will go up in both
informal sectors. Also the intermediate input producing sector would expand in terms of both
output and employment. A government policy of capital-market reform in the informal sector
would encourage this wage-improvement even more in this scenario.
Intuitive Argument: Since now return to capital in the formal sector, ݎ, is already
determined from the zero-profit condition for sector 4; the technological progress in sector 3
would lead to an increase in price of the intermediate input. So from the zero-profit condition
of sector 2 it is imminent that the real informal wage would increase. Now producers in the
intermediate input producing sector will substitute capital for the costlier labour in the
production. Given the endowment of capital in the economy, this will create relative shortage
in capital-availability and therefore a subsequent ‘Rybczynski-type’ effect in the HOSS.
Under our reasonable assumption that sector 4 is relatively more capital-intensive than sector
3 in physical and value terms, sector 4 will contract while sector 3 will expand and given the
complementary relationship between sector 3 and sector 2, sector 2 will expand as well. As a
result unskilled labourers will move from sector 1 to sector 2 and sector 2 will expand both in
terms of output and employment.
Now a government policy to reform the informal credit market would reduce
ܴby reducingߩ. From the zero-profit condition for the intermediate input producing sector,
it is clear that it will pronounce the informal wage increase even more.
4.1 Uniform Technological Progress by ࢻ > ૙ in All Traded Sectors and Informal
Wage Response – A Sensitivity Analysis for India.
Now we examine implication of a uniform technological progress by ߙ in both export and
import-competing formal sectors on the informal wage (not taking into account any
government policy of credit market reform in the informal sector). So each of the two formal
sectors undergo uniform technological improvement by ߙ. We will show this using a
sensitivity analysis for India. Totally differentiating Equations (1), (2.1), (3) and (4); applying
envelope conditions and using Cramer’s rule, allowing for both sectors 3 and 4 to undergo
productivity improvement by ߙ > 0 the key equation of change will become:
෡ܹ = ఈ
ఏమయఏಽమ
ቄ1 −
(ఏ಼యାఏ಼మఏమయ)
ఏ಼ర
ቅ (12)
We use Equation (12) to quantify the relationship between productivity change in the formal
segment and changes in informal wage. We assign the following parameter values for the
initial equilibrium according to the assumptions in the model in a close approximation to the
actual data for India8.
ߠ௄ଶ = 0.3; ߠ௄ଷ = 0.4; ߠଶଷ = 0.1 (fixed); ߠ௄ସ = 0.5.
8 See Appendix II for the details of the sources and different ranges of parameter values.
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Figure 1
Note that the relationship between technological progress in the formal sectors and change in
informal wage is positive. So given the parameter values we have adopted for initial
equilibrium, when the formal segment of the economy (i.e., both sectors 3 and 4 in our
model) undergoes technological improvement by 5% or 8% the model predicts that informal
wage would increase by about 10% and 16% respectively.
This is because in our model when both formal sectors experience uniform technological
progress by α>0, the relatively capital-intensive sector 4 would demand more capital to 
expand which would push up the return to capital in both informal and formal sectors which
would lead to the ‘first round effect’ mentioned before. At the same time the relatively capital
un-intensive sector 3 is also experiencing technological progress and they would expand by
saving on capital cost and demanding more of the non-traded intermediary from sector 2. In
this scenario when capital accumulation in the informal sectors rise in the ‘second-round
effect’, it would further help to expand both sector 3 and sector 2, nullifying the ‘first round
effect’. Sector 2, would only expand by substituting labour for capital, which would increase
the demand for informal workers in sector 2 and the informal wage. This positive impact on
informal wage depends crucially on how much sector 3 has been able to save on its capital
costs of production. As we will show in our numerical analysis in Table 1, a small decrease in
capital cost share in sector 3 would increase the growth in informal wage. Therefore lower
capital availability in the formal segment vis-à-vis the informal sectors should be crucial for
the upsurge of informal wage in response to uniform technological progress by equal
percentage in all the traded formal sectors of the economy. This fact is further supported in
our empirical section.
We use the following table to verify Equation (12) in response to changes in the parameters
(except the cost share of intermediate input in the export sector,ߠଶଷ, which is held fixed). We
11
adopt ߙ = 0.08 in case of India (Kathuria et al. 2013). As expected, if the cost share of
capital in the export sector goes down just by 7.5% from the initial equilibrium value, the
informal wage rises by 23% whereas in initial equilibrium, the increase in informal wage was
about 16%. If cost share of capital in sector 4 goes up by 10%, then the subsequent
Rybczynski-type effect in the HOSS will benefit the informal workers in terms of wages and
employment.
Table 1 – Effect of ࢻ = ૙.૙ૡ under Parametric Assumptions
Simulation
Rounds
ߠ௄ଶ= 1 − ߠ௅ଶ ߠ௄ଷ ߠ௄ସ ߠଶଷ(fixed) ෡ܹ
Sim1 (Initial
Equilibrium)
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.16
Sim 2 0.3 0.37 (↓) 0.5 0.1 0.23 (↑)
Sim 3 0.3 0.4 0.55(↑) 0.1 0.25 (↑)
5. Empirical Evidence for India:
In this section we are going to provide some evidence from the liberalisation experience in
India. For informal units, there exist surveys conducted by ‘National Sample Survey
Organization’ (NSSO), Government of India. In particular, given our concerns in this paper,
we have used data from various rounds of this survey on average yearly wage and fixed
assets formation in Non-Directory Manufacturing Enterprises (NDMEs) in the urban sector,
because of their strong interlinkages with urban formal sectors for 1989-90, 1994-95, 2000-
01 and 2010-11 across twenty-six Indian States and one union territory (Chandigarh). For the
formal units, we have taken data on formal sector net value added and net capital
accumulation on these years for these twenty-seven cross-sectional units from Annual Survey
of Industries (ASI), Government of India. The informal sector real wages have been
constructed by deflating the nominal wages using 2001-02 Consumer Price Index; the
informal real fixed assets (proxy for capital accumulation in the informal sector) and the real
capital accumulation in the formal sectors have been formed by deflating the nominal figures
using 2001-02 Wholesale Price Indices (WPI) for Machinery and Machine Products; while
the formal sector real value-added (VA) has been constructed by deflating the nominal
figures using 2001-02 WPI for Manufactured products.
It is clearly seen from our data that average growth rates of real wages in the NDMEs over
1989-20109 have been fairly positive for all twenty-seven cross-sectional units (Figure A1 in
Appendix II). Real VA in the formal sectors has exhibited positive trends (see Figure A2 in
Appendix II) in almost all Indian States (except Bihar), including the U.T. Chandigarh,
during this period. Interestingly, relative capital accumulation in the informal sector (i.e., real
9 Note that 1989 is the survey year just before the Indian economic reform of 1991.
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FA formation in NDMEs) vis-à-vis that in the formal units also exhibited positive average
growth rates (Figure A3 in Appendix II) over this period for almost all States. Table A1-A2
(Appendix II) offers detailed descriptive statistics for the variables under consideration10.
According to the relationship suggested by our theoretical model depicted in Figure 1 of the
main text, it is possible for the informal wages to rise when there is growth in the formal
segment following uniform technological progress, while a rise in fixed assets formation in
informal sectors over the formal segment should expedite the growth in informal wage. To
test this hypothesis we use panel fixed effects (FE) model to take into consideration the
possible State-specific effects, where our dependent variable is the real informal wage (ݓ)
and the regressors are formal VA (ܽݒ ) and difference in real fixed assets formation
(equivalent to capital accumulation) in informal vis-à-vis formal sectors (݇݅ ݂݇ ); where all
varibles are expressed in logarithms. After the so-called ‘within transformation’, the model
looks like:(ݓ௜௧− ݓపതതത) = ߚଵ(ܽݒ ௜௧− ܽݒ పതതതത) + ߚଶ(݇݅ ݂݇ ௜௧− ଓ݇݇ ప݂തതതതതത) + ( ௜߳௧− ప߳ഥ) (13)
We present the results for Generalised Least Squares (GLS) model (heteroscedasticity
corrected), Random Effectes (RE) model and the Fixed Effects (FE) model in Table 2.
10 It should be noted that many other important variables that could be potential candidates in the exercise, such
as rental costs in different sectors, gender-specific wages etc., are excluded here primarily to provide an overall
explanation of the key relationship predicted by our model in Figure 1.
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Table 2 – Regression Results
The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects certainly suggests that
there are no random effects and therefore our heteroscedasticity corrected GLS would have
been preferred in this case. However it is evident from the F-test that the twenty-six dummies
(implicitly used) are jointly significant at 1% which of course directs us to switch to FE
model from the GLS one. We have also used the robust version of Hausman test (which takes
‘cluster-robust’ standard errors) and found that the ‘Sargan-Hansen statistic’ is significant at
1% level; which confirms our selection of the FE model over the RE model. Also it is evident
from Table A4 that the estimated elasticities are more precise in FE model compared to the
other two models. Now in our FE regression, we have found that both the estimated
elasticities are positive and statistically significant at 1% level. Results suggest a 1% growth
in formal VA is associated with a 0.3% increase in real wage in the urban NDMEs over 1989-
2010, while a 1% growth in real capital accumulation in informal units vis-à-vis formal zones
is associated with a 0.07% increase in informal real wage. The growth in value-added in the
organized sectors and in real fixed assets formation in the urban NDMEs over the real capital
accumulation in the organized segment of the Indian States have been our empirical
approximations in this context. This supports the relationship suggested by our model in
Figure 1 which predicts that if all the traded formal sectors undergo uniform productivity
improvement by equal percentage amount, then informal real wage could increase, provided
substantial amount of capital is also re-allocated from the formal segment to the informal
units.
Dep. Variable ݓ
GLS corrected for
Heteroscedasticity
FE Model RE Model
ܽݒ 0.104** 0.312*** 0.102**
(0.539) (0.018) (0.641)
݇݅ ݂݇ 0.106** 0.069*** 0.105*
(0.612) (0.023) (1.020)
Constant 4.109*** 2.669*** 4.080***
(0.159) (0.311) (0.189)
N 108 108 108
F test that all ݑ௜= 0: ܨ(26,79) = 2.14∗∗∗
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects: ݓ(ݏܽݐ ݁ݐ ݅݀ ,ݐ) = ܾܺ+ ݑ(ݏܽݐ ݁ݐ ݅݀ ) +(݁ݏܽݐ ݁ݐ ݅݀ ,ݐ). ℎܾܿ݅ ܽݎ2(01) = 0.27
Hausman Test: Sargan-Hansen statistic = 20.195***
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. ݓ =log (real informal wage); ܽݒ =log (value-added in the
organised sectors); ݇݅ ݂݇ =log (real FA formation in the informal units over those in the formal sectors).
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6. Concluding Remarks:
It is quite well-established that recent growth in Indian economy is fuelled primarily by
upsurge in productivity in the traded sectors which has been quite substantial over the recent
years. Given that informal activities comprising the majority of the urban workforce who are
economically marginalized, we investigate: how a technological progress in the traded sectors
of the economy would affect the informal wage with segmentation in factor markets? In our
simple general equilibrium model in the traded formal sectors wages are pegged at a higher
level than the competitive wages by prior negotiations with labour unions; while dualism in
the capital market is characterised by the fragmented interest rate structure, featuring lower
allocation of loanable capital to the informal sector at a higher relative rental rate. We have
provided a sensitivity analysis of our model using plausible ranges of parameter values for
India and also provided empirical evidence from Indian data across twenty-seven States
(including one U.T.) over 1989-2010. Our sensitivity analysis supports the fact that a uniform
productivity take-off by equal percentage in all the traded formal/organised sectors could
potentially help the informal workers if the vertically integrated export sector could save
more on their capital cost of production; in other words, less capital will be allocated in the
formal segment of the economy vis-à-vis the informal units, which has also received support
in our empirical section. We have addressed the crucial policy-question whether and under
what economic conditions the benefit of productivity improvement in the traded sectors
would trickle down to the marginalised workforce of urban area living in so-called ‘informal
sectors’ through the impact on their real wages and employment conditions.
References:
1. Agenor, P.R. (1996), ‘The Labor Market and Economic Adjustment’, IMF Staff
Papers 32, pp. 261 – 335.
2. Beladi, Hamid, Chaudhuri, Sarbajit and Yabuuchi, Shigemi (2008), ‘Can International
Factor Mobility Reduce Wage Inequality in a Dual Economy?’ Review of
International Economics 16, pp. 893 – 903.
3. Beladi, Hamid, Vina, Lynda De la and Marjit, Sugata (2012), ‘Technological Progress
with Segmented Labor Markets’, Review of Development Economics 16(1), pp. 148 –
152.
4. Chaudhuri, S. (2003), ‘How and how far to liberalize a developing economy with
informal sector and factor market distortions’, J. Int. Trade & Economic Development
12(4), pp. 403-428.
5. Chaudhuri, S. (2005), ‘Labour Market Distortion, Technology Transfer and Gainful
Effects of Foreign Capital’, The Manchester School 73(2), pp. 214–227.
6. Chaudhuri, S., Yabbuchi, S. and Mukhopadhyay, U. (2006), ‘Inflow of Foreign
Capital and Trade Liberalization in a Model with an Informal Sector and Urban
Unemployment’, Pacific Economic Review 11(1), pp. 87–103.
15
7. Ethier, Wilfred J. (2005), ‘Globalization, globalisation: Trade, technology, and
wages’, International Review of Economics & Finance 14(3), pp. 237–258.
8. Findlay, R. (1978), ‘Relative Backwardness, Direct Foreign Investment and the
Transfer of Technology: a Simple Dynamic Model’, Quarterly Journal of Economics
92, pp. 1–16.
9. Findlay, Ronald and Jones, Ronald W. (2000), ‘Factor Bias and Technical Progress’,
Economics Letters 68, pp. 303 – 308.
10. Goldberg, P and N Pavcnik (2003): ‘The Response of the Informal Sector to Trade
Liberalisation’, Journal of Development Economics 72(2), pp. 463–496.
11. Guha-Khasnobis, B. and Faisal Bari (2003), ‘Sources of Growth in South Asian
Countries’ in Isher Judge Ahluwalia and John Williamson (Eds.), The South Asian
Experience with Growth, Oxford University Press.
12. Gupta, M. R. (1994) ‘Duty-Free Zone, Unemployment and Welfare: a Note’, Journal
of Economics 59, pp. 217–236.
13. Jones, Ronald W. (1965), ‘The Structure of Simple General Equilibrium Models’,
Journal of Political Economy 73, pp. 551 – 572.
14. Jones, Ronald W. (1971), ‘A Three-factor Model in Theory, Trade and History’, in
Bhagwati, J., et al. (eds.), Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth, North-Holland,
Amsterdam.
15. Jones, Ronald W. (1996), ‘International Trade, Real Wages and Technical Progress:
The Specific-factors Model’, International Review of Economics and Finance 5, pp.
113 – 124.
16. Jones, Ronald W. (2003), ‘Joint Outputs and Real Wage Rates’, International Review
of Economics and Finance 12, pp. 513 – 516.
17. Jones, Ronald W. (2006), ‘‘Protection and Real Wages’: The History of an Idea’,
Japanese Economic Review 57, pp. 457 – 466.
18. Kar, S. and Marjit, Sugata (2009), ‘Urban Informal Sector and Poverty’, International
Review of Economics and Finance 18, pp. 631–642.
19. Kathuria, Vinish, Rajesh S.N. Raj and Kunal Sen (2012), ‘Productivity Measurement
in Indian Manufacturing: A Comparison of Alternative Methods’ Journal of
Quantitative Economics 11 (No.s 1 & 2).
20. Kathuria, Vinish, Rajesh S.N. Raj and Kunal Sen (2013), ‘The effects of economic
reforms on manufacturing dualism: Evidence from India’ Journal of Comparative
Economics 41, pp. 1240–1262.
21. Koizumi, T. and Kopecky, K. J. (1977), ‘Economic Growth, Capital Movements and
the International Transfer of Technical Knowledge’, Journal of International
Economics 7, pp. 45–65.
22. Koizumi, T. and Kopecky, K. J. (1980), ‘Foreign direct investment, technology
transfer and domestic employment effects’, Journal of International Economics 10,
pp. 1–20.
23. Krugman, Paul R. (2000), ‘Technology, trade and factor prices’, Journal of
International Economics 50, pp. 51 – 71.
24. Marjit, S. (2003), ‘Economic Reform and Informal Wage: A General Equilibrium
Analysis’, Journal of Development Economics 72(1), pp. 371-378.
16
25. Marjit, S. and S. Kar (2004), ‘Pro-Market Reform and Informal Wage: Theory and the
Contemporary Indian Perspective’, India Macroeconomics Annual 2004-05, pp. 130-
156.
26. Marjit, S, S Kar and H Beladi (2007), ‘Trade Reform and Informal Wages’, Review of
Development Economics 11(2), pp. 313-320.
27. Marjit, S., Kar, S. and R Acharyaa (2007): ‘Agricultural Prospects and Informal Wage
in General Equilibrium’, Economic Modelling, 24(3), pp. 380-385.
28. Marjit, S., and Kar, S. (2008), ‘Labor Productivity Growth, Informal Wage and
Capital Mobility – A General Equilibrium Analysis’, in Ravi Kanbur and Jan Svejnar
(Eds.) Labour Markets and Economic Development, NY: Routledge, 2008.
29. Marjit, S., and Kar, S. (2008), ‘Productivity and Wage in the Informal Sector’ in
Footprints of Development and Change:Ch 5 (V K R V Rao Centenary Volume), New
Delhi: AF.
30. Marjit, S., Kar, S. and D. Maity (2008), ‘Labour Market Reform and Poverty – The
Role of Informal Sector’ in Bhaskar Dutta (ed.), Issues in Development (NY: World
Scientific Press).
31. Marjit, S., and Kar, S. (2009), ‘A Contemporary Perspective on the Informal Labour
Market: Theory, Policy and the Indian Experience’, Economic and Political Weekly
Vol. XLIV, No. 14, pp. 60 – 71.
32. Mukherjee, Soumyatanu (2012), ‘Revisiting the Apparent Paradox: Foreign Capital
Inflow, Welfare Amelioration and ‘Jobless Growth’ with Agricultural Dualism and
Non-traded Intermediate Input’; Journal of Economic Integration, 27(1), pp. 123-133.
33. Mukherjee, Soumyatanu (2014), ‘Liberalization and ‘Jobless Growth’ in Developing
Economy – Some Extended Results’; Journal of Economic Integration (forthcoming).
34. Norback, Pehr-Johan (2001), ‘Cumulative effects of labor market distortions in a
developing country’, Journal of Development Economics 65(1), pp. 135-152.
35. Schneider, F. and Enste, D.H. (2000), ‘Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and
Consequences’, Journal of Economic Literature 38, pp. 77 – 114.
Appendix II
Figure A1
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NOTES: AN – Andaman & Nikober; AP – Andhra Pradesh; AS – Assam; BI – Bihar; CH
– Chandigarh; DL – Delhi; DNH – Dadra-Nagar-Haveli; GO – Goa; GU – Gujrat; HP –
Himachal Pradesh; HY – Haryana; JK – Jammu & Kashmir; KA – Karnataka; KE –
Kerala; MA – Manipur; ME – Meghalaya; MH – Maharashtra; MP – Madhya Pradesh;
NG – Nagaland; OR – Orissa; PJ – Punjab; PO – Pondicherry; RJ – Rajasthan; TN – Tamil
Nadu; TR – Tripura; UP – Uttar Pradesh; WB – West Bengal.
Figure A2
AP AS
BI
GO
GU
HY
HP
JK
KA
KE
MP
MH
MA
ME
NG
OR
PJ
RJ
TN
TR
UPWB
AN
CH
DNH
DL
PO
0
.2
.4
.6
Av
er
ag
e
G
ro
w
th
R
at
e
in
In
fo
rm
al
W
ag
e
ov
er
19
89
-2
01
0
50 100 150 200
Informal Real Wage (Rs.) on 1989
27 Indian States
Avg. Growth Rate in Informal Wage over 1989-2010 vs.Initial
18
Figure A3
Descriptive Statistics:
AP
AS
BI
GO
GUHY
HP
JK
KA
KE
MP
MH
MAE
NG
OR
PJ
RJ TN
TR
UP
WB
ANCH
DNH
DL
PO
-.5
0
.5
1
1.5
A
ve
ra
ge
G
ro
w
th
R
at
e
in
Fo
rm
al
V
A
ov
er
19
89
-2
01
0
0 5000 10000 15000 20000
Real VA in Organised Sectors (Rs. Lakh)
27 Indian States
Average Growth Rate in Formal VA over 1989-2010 vs. Initial
AP
AS
BI
GO
GU
HY
HP
JKKA
KE
MP
MH
MA
ME
NG
OR
PJ
RJ
TN
TR
UP
WB
AN
CH
DNH
DL
PO
-.5
0
.5
1
1.5
A
ve
ra
ge
R
at
e
of
C
ha
ng
e
in
R
el
at
iv
e
K
A
ov
er
19
89
-2
01
0
-200 0 200 400 600
Relative KA Informal Vs. Formal 1989 (Rs. Lakh)
27 Indian States
Average Growth Rate in Relative KA over 1989-2010 vs.Initial
19
Table A1:
Year Obs. Log (real
informal wage)
Log(formal VA) Log (KA inf – KA
formal)
mean std mean std mean std
1989 27 4.43 0.38 6.50 2.66 1.70 2.77
1994 27 4.99 0.24 6.89 2.64 0.15 3.07
2000 27 5.27 0.20 6.98 2.67 4.15 3.04
2010 27 5.56 0.28 8.29 2.42 2.77 2.96
Table A2:
No. of
Observations
Variables
Avg. Growth Rate in
Informal RW (%) over
1989-2010
Avg. Growth Rate in
Formal VA over 1989-
2010 (%)
Avg. Growth in
Relative KA, Informal
Vs. Formal, 1989-2010
(%)
Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E.
27 0.38 0.14 0.60 0.33 0.36 0.40
